Audit records¶
Every policy decision, approval decision and change Charter makes is written
as one JSON line on the audit log target, and mirrored as a Kubernetes Event
on the IAMClient. Ship the log to your SIEM with immutable retention; the
Events are a convenience for operators and expire.
Shape¶
The log line wraps the record as a string in fields.audit:
{"timestamp":"2026-11-14T15:30:33.1Z","level":"INFO","fields":{"audit":"{...record...}"},"target":"audit"}
The record:
{
"schema": "charter.audit/v1",
"seq": 64,
"prev_hash": "03b2758e96ea...",
"time": "2026-11-14T15:30:33.186+00:00",
"actor": "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee",
"action": "add_password",
"outcome": "succeeded",
"subject": {
"namespace": "team-payments",
"name": "payments-portal",
"uid": "0f6c1a52-4c1e-4b0e-9d6e-3a9f1d2b7c44",
"generation": 3,
"spec_hash": "2145c2d8...",
"admin_hash": "652146da...",
"last_modified_by": "system:serviceaccount:charter-system:charter-provisioner",
"unique_name": "charter-team-payments-payments-portal",
"requested_by": "alice@example.com",
"approved_by": "bob@example.com",
"change_ref": "CHG0012345",
"correlation_id": "b1f8..."
},
"details": { "lifetime": "90d", "reason": "rotation" }
}
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
schema |
charter.audit/v1 |
seq |
Sequence number, per controller process |
prev_hash |
SHA-256 of the previous record's JSON (64 zeros for the first record of a process) |
time |
RFC 3339 |
actor |
The controller's Entra client ID |
action |
See below |
outcome |
attempted, succeeded, failed, denied or info |
subject |
The IAMClient and its approval evidence at the time |
subject.correlation_id |
Same for every record of one reconcile pass |
details |
Non-secret parameters: key IDs, fields, owner IDs, reasons |
error |
Present on failed: the error text |
Secret values never appear in records or logs: secrets and tokens are held in a type that redacts itself when printed and zeroes its memory when dropped.
Bracketed mutations¶
Every change to Entra or to delivered credentials is recorded twice: once as
attempted before the call, then as succeeded or failed after it. A
crash mid-call still leaves evidence of intent.
Actions¶
| Action | Outcomes | details |
|---|---|---|
policy_check |
denied |
violations |
approval_check |
denied, info |
change (Create, AdminChange, OwnerChange), authority (admin_approval, owner) or reason |
create_application |
bracketed | displayName, redirectUris |
drift_detected |
info |
fields, or unexpectedOwner |
update_application |
bracketed | fields |
create_service_principal |
bracketed | appId |
add_owner |
bracketed | ownerId |
remove_owner |
bracketed | ownerId |
add_password |
bracketed | lifetime, reason (initial_or_missing, rotation, lifetime_shortened) |
deliver_secret |
bracketed | secret, keyId |
apply_push_secret |
bracketed | pushSecret, store, remoteKey, keys |
delete_push_secret |
bracketed | pushSecret, reason (push_secret_removed_from_spec, iamclient_deleted) |
remove_password |
bracketed | keyId, reason (rotated_out, unknown_credential, deletion_policy_retain) |
delete_application |
bracketed | appId, softDeleteDays |
retain_application |
info |
appId |
cleanup |
info |
reason ("application already absent") |
Kubernetes Events¶
Each record is also published as an Event on the IAMClient, with reason
<action>:<Outcome> (for example add_password:Succeeded), type Warning
for failed and denied and Normal otherwise, and the details or error as
the note (truncated to 900 characters). Publishing is best effort: the log is
the record.
Querying¶
Find everything that happened to one client, or under one change:
Alert on outcome in (failed, denied) and on any drift_detected.
Integrity¶
seq and prev_hash make gaps and edits detectable within one process run.
The SIEM's immutable storage is the system of record; the chain is a
tamper-evidence aid, not a replacement for it.