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Threat model

Design-level threat model for Charter. It covers what the design does about each threat; it is not a record of test findings.

Assets

Asset Why it matters
Client secrets of managed apps Let anyone impersonate the application to Entra
The controller's Entra identity Can create apps and change every app it owns
App registration configuration (redirect URIs especially) A rogue redirect URI lets an attacker receive authorization codes
The audit trail Evidence for every change; must be complete and untampered
The approval record Proves each change was authorised

Trust boundaries

flowchart LR subgraph T1[Admins and Git] A[Platform admins] end subgraph T2[Tenant namespaces] O[Owning teams] W[Workloads + Secret] end subgraph T3[charter-system] C[charter-iam] end subgraph T4[Microsoft cloud] E[(Entra ID)] end B[(OpenBao)] A -- "B1: provision, admin changes" --> C O -- "B2: redirectURIs only" --> C C -- "B3: Graph, OwnedBy" --> E C -- "B4: Secret, PushSecret" --> W W -.-> B

Threats and mitigations

STRIDE category in brackets.

B1: admins and provisioning

Threat Mitigation
A single person creates and approves their own client [Elevation] Requester and approver must differ; checked at admission and by the controller
An admin change slips in without a new ticket [Tampering] The admin-field hash must change together with the change reference, or nothing is applied
Flux or Git is compromised and provisions a rogue client [Elevation] Redirect domain policy still applies; every client is audited with its change reference for reconciliation against the change system

B2: owning teams

Threat Mitigation
An owner adds a redirect URI on an attacker's domain [Spoofing] Allowed domain list at admission and in the controller; HTTPS only; no wildcards
An owner edits an admin-only field, e.g. adds themselves as owner or lengthens secret lifetime [Elevation] Admission allows only redirectURIs to change; the controller's admin hash blocks it without a new change reference
An owner forges approval annotations [Spoofing] Admission rejects non-admin changes to them
An owner hides who made a change [Repudiation] last-modified-by is stamped by admission from the authenticated user, overwriting any value
An owner redirects their secret to a store they control [Information disclosure] Only allow-listed ClusterSecretStores; path fixed by the controller
An owner reads another team's secret Secrets are written only in the client's own namespace; OpenBao paths are per namespace and name

B3: controller to Entra

Threat Mitigation
The controller's credential leaks [Spoofing] No stored credential: workload identity federation with short-lived projected tokens
The controller is compromised and modifies other apps [Elevation] Application.ReadWrite.OwnedBy: only apps the controller created
Someone edits a managed app in the portal [Tampering] Drift detection reverts and records it
Someone adds a secret in the portal [Spoofing] Unknown passwords are revoked on the next reconcile
A rotation leaves consumers with a revoked secret [Denial of service] Grace window; with OpenBao delivery, revocation waits for the push
Graph's eventual consistency causes duplicate secrets or wrong revocations [Tampering] uniqueName keyed upsert; a recently delivered key that Graph does not list yet is treated as lag, not loss
Network path to Graph is intercepted [Information disclosure] HTTPS only; recommended egress restriction to the two Microsoft endpoints

B4: delivery

Threat Mitigation
Secret value appears in logs or events [Information disclosure] Held as SecretString; records carry key IDs only
Secret stays readable after the client is deleted [Information disclosure] Secrets revoked in Entra; Kubernetes Secret garbage-collected; OpenBao copy deleted with its versions
Kubernetes Secret read from etcd or by broad RBAC [Information disclosure] Out of Charter's scope: KMS encryption at rest and tight Secret RBAC are required in the install checklist

The audit trail

Threat Mitigation
A change happens with no record [Repudiation] attempted is written before every mutation; Entra's own audit log is a second, independent record
Records are edited or dropped [Tampering] Sequence numbers and a hash chain make gaps and edits detectable; immutable SIEM storage is the system of record

Out of scope

  • Compromise of the Kubernetes control plane or of cluster admins.
  • Compromise of Entra itself, or of a Global Administrator.
  • How consuming applications protect the secret once they have read it.

Residual risks and open items

Tracked in compliance: open items, including leader election, egress restriction, Entra audit log reconciliation, and a penetration test before production onboarding.