Threat model
Design-level threat model for Charter. It covers what the design does about
each threat; it is not a record of test findings.
Assets
| Asset |
Why it matters |
| Client secrets of managed apps |
Let anyone impersonate the application to Entra |
| The controller's Entra identity |
Can create apps and change every app it owns |
| App registration configuration (redirect URIs especially) |
A rogue redirect URI lets an attacker receive authorization codes |
| The audit trail |
Evidence for every change; must be complete and untampered |
| The approval record |
Proves each change was authorised |
Trust boundaries
flowchart LR
subgraph T1[Admins and Git]
A[Platform admins]
end
subgraph T2[Tenant namespaces]
O[Owning teams]
W[Workloads + Secret]
end
subgraph T3[charter-system]
C[charter-iam]
end
subgraph T4[Microsoft cloud]
E[(Entra ID)]
end
B[(OpenBao)]
A -- "B1: provision, admin changes" --> C
O -- "B2: redirectURIs only" --> C
C -- "B3: Graph, OwnedBy" --> E
C -- "B4: Secret, PushSecret" --> W
W -.-> B
Threats and mitigations
STRIDE category in brackets.
B1: admins and provisioning
| Threat |
Mitigation |
| A single person creates and approves their own client [Elevation] |
Requester and approver must differ; checked at admission and by the controller |
| An admin change slips in without a new ticket [Tampering] |
The admin-field hash must change together with the change reference, or nothing is applied |
| Flux or Git is compromised and provisions a rogue client [Elevation] |
Redirect domain policy still applies; every client is audited with its change reference for reconciliation against the change system |
B2: owning teams
| Threat |
Mitigation |
| An owner adds a redirect URI on an attacker's domain [Spoofing] |
Allowed domain list at admission and in the controller; HTTPS only; no wildcards |
| An owner edits an admin-only field, e.g. adds themselves as owner or lengthens secret lifetime [Elevation] |
Admission allows only redirectURIs to change; the controller's admin hash blocks it without a new change reference |
| An owner forges approval annotations [Spoofing] |
Admission rejects non-admin changes to them |
| An owner hides who made a change [Repudiation] |
last-modified-by is stamped by admission from the authenticated user, overwriting any value |
| An owner redirects their secret to a store they control [Information disclosure] |
Only allow-listed ClusterSecretStores; path fixed by the controller |
| An owner reads another team's secret |
Secrets are written only in the client's own namespace; OpenBao paths are per namespace and name |
B3: controller to Entra
| Threat |
Mitigation |
| The controller's credential leaks [Spoofing] |
No stored credential: workload identity federation with short-lived projected tokens |
| The controller is compromised and modifies other apps [Elevation] |
Application.ReadWrite.OwnedBy: only apps the controller created |
| Someone edits a managed app in the portal [Tampering] |
Drift detection reverts and records it |
| Someone adds a secret in the portal [Spoofing] |
Unknown passwords are revoked on the next reconcile |
| A rotation leaves consumers with a revoked secret [Denial of service] |
Grace window; with OpenBao delivery, revocation waits for the push |
| Graph's eventual consistency causes duplicate secrets or wrong revocations [Tampering] |
uniqueName keyed upsert; a recently delivered key that Graph does not list yet is treated as lag, not loss |
| Network path to Graph is intercepted [Information disclosure] |
HTTPS only; recommended egress restriction to the two Microsoft endpoints |
B4: delivery
| Threat |
Mitigation |
| Secret value appears in logs or events [Information disclosure] |
Held as SecretString; records carry key IDs only |
| Secret stays readable after the client is deleted [Information disclosure] |
Secrets revoked in Entra; Kubernetes Secret garbage-collected; OpenBao copy deleted with its versions |
| Kubernetes Secret read from etcd or by broad RBAC [Information disclosure] |
Out of Charter's scope: KMS encryption at rest and tight Secret RBAC are required in the install checklist |
The audit trail
| Threat |
Mitigation |
| A change happens with no record [Repudiation] |
attempted is written before every mutation; Entra's own audit log is a second, independent record |
| Records are edited or dropped [Tampering] |
Sequence numbers and a hash chain make gaps and edits detectable; immutable SIEM storage is the system of record |
Out of scope
- Compromise of the Kubernetes control plane or of cluster admins.
- Compromise of Entra itself, or of a Global Administrator.
- How consuming applications protect the secret once they have read it.
Residual risks and open items
Tracked in compliance: open items,
including leader election, egress restriction, Entra audit log reconciliation,
and a penetration test before production onboarding.