Compliance design and control mapping¶
Status: design intent for review with Enterprise IAM, Technology Risk and Internal Audit. The mappings below say which control objective each mechanism supports; they are not a compliance attestation. Control references should be confirmed against RBC's own control library before use.
Principles¶
- Fail closed. No change reaches Entra unless policy checks and the approval check both pass. Missing config means "deny", not "allow".
- Every change has a person, a reviewer and a ticket. Requester and approver are recorded on the object and in every audit record, and must differ.
- Every external change is evidenced twice. The controller's own audit log, and Entra's directory audit log for the controller's service principal. Reconciling the two is a detective control.
- Least privilege, no standing secrets. Graph
Application.ReadWrite.OwnedByonly; workload identity federation instead of a client secret. - The IAMClient is the system of record for intent; Entra is converged to it. Out-of-band changes in Entra are detected, audited and reverted.
- Admins create, owners maintain. Creation, deletion and admin-only fields need a platform admin and a change reference. Owners may change redirect URIs themselves, within the redirect domain policy.
How a change flows¶
Create (admin only)
Team request -> approval in the change system (requester != approver, CHG ref)
-> platform admin adds a ResourceSetInputProvider in charter-system
(requestedBy, approvedBy, changeRef, owners, ownerGroup, groups, ...)
-> Flux ResourceSet, as the charter-provisioner SA, renders:
IAMClient + Role/RoleBinding letting ownerGroup edit that one IAMClient
-> admission: only admins/provisioner may create; author stamped
-> controller: policy check -> approval check -> audited Graph calls
Owner update (redirect URIs)
Owner: kubectl edit / patch iamclient payments-portal (RBAC: that object only)
-> admission: only spec.redirectURIs may differ; https, allowed domain, no wildcard;
last-modified-by stamped from the authenticated user
-> controller: policy check; admin hash unchanged so no admin approval needed;
audited Graph update records last_modified_by
Admin change (owners, groups, rotation, Dex, deletion policy, display name)
Admin updates the input provider with a new change reference. Admission blocks
anyone else from changing these fields. The controller backstops it: if the
hash of the admin-only fields changed and the change reference did not, it
stops with Ready=False, reason=PendingApproval and a denied audit record,
and applies nothing.
The Kubernetes API server audit log records every write to IAMClients with the
authenticated user; together with last-modified-by and the controller's
records (which carry the object's generation) this gives a full chain from
person to Entra change.
Audit record¶
One JSON line per event on the audit log target (schema charter.audit/v1),
shipped to the SIEM with immutable retention, and mirrored as a Kubernetes Event.
| Field | Purpose |
|---|---|
seq, prev_hash |
Per-process sequence and SHA-256 chain; gaps or edits are detectable |
time, actor |
When, and which workload identity acted |
action, outcome |
e.g. add_password / attempted, succeeded, failed, denied, info |
subject |
Namespace, name, UID, generation, spec hash, admin-field hash, Entra uniqueName |
subject.last_modified_by |
Kubernetes user who last wrote the object, stamped by admission |
subject.requested_by, approved_by, change_ref |
Who asked, who approved, which change |
subject.correlation_id |
Ties all records from one reconcile together |
details |
Non-secret parameters (key IDs, fields changed, owner IDs) |
Mutations are logged as attempted before the call and succeeded/failed
after, so intent is recorded even if the process dies mid-call. Secret values
never appear: they are held in SecretString (redacted Debug, zeroized on drop).
Actions recorded: policy_check, approval_check, create_application,
update_application, drift_detected, create_service_principal,
add_owner, remove_owner, add_password, deliver_secret,
remove_password, apply_push_secret, delete_push_secret,
delete_application, retain_application, cleanup.
Control mapping¶
| Control objective | Mechanism | Evidence an auditor can pull | SOX ITGC area | NIST SP 800-53 | OSFI B-13 domain |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Changes are authorised before implementation | Creation and admin-only fields need an admin and a change reference (admission + controller backstop) | Change tickets, approval_check records, status.changeRef, API server audit log |
Change management | CM-3, CM-5 | Technology operations (change management) |
| Owner self-service is bounded | Owners hold RBAC on their own IAMClient only; admission limits them to redirectURIs within allowed domains |
Per-client Role/RoleBinding, VAP denials, last_modified_by in audit records |
Logical access, change management | AC-3, AC-6, CM-5 | Cyber security (identity and access) |
| Separation of duties | Requester must differ from approver; controller cannot approve | Annotations and audit subject fields |
Change management | AC-5 | Governance |
| Least privilege for automation | Application.ReadWrite.OwnedBy; owner set limited to spec + controller |
Entra app role assignment for controller SP | Logical access | AC-6 | Cyber security (identity and access) |
| No standing credentials for automation | Workload identity federation; client-secret auth disabled unless ALLOW_CLIENT_SECRET_AUTH=true |
Deployment manifest, absence of secrets on controller SP | Logical access | IA-5 | Cyber security |
| Credential lifecycle | Max lifetime policy, rotation at one-third remaining, grace window, revoke stale and unknown secrets | add_password / remove_password records, Entra keyCredential dates |
Logical access | IA-5(1), AC-2 | Cyber security |
| Accountability for every app | At least one human owner required; owners reconciled | add_owner / remove_owner records, Entra owners list |
Logical access | AC-2 | Governance |
| Configuration integrity | Drift detection on name, audience, group claims, redirect URIs, owners, secrets | drift_detected records |
Change management | CM-3, CM-6, SI-7 | Technology operations |
| Secure redirect configuration | HTTPS only, allowed domain list, no wildcards, no loopback in prod | policy_check denials |
Change management | SC-23, CM-7 | Cyber security |
| Audit logging content and protection | Structured records, hash chain, SIEM with immutable retention | SIEM query by subject.uid or change_ref |
IT operations | AU-2, AU-3, AU-9, AU-12 | Cyber security (logging and monitoring) |
| Secret delivery to the vault | Optional spec.pushSecret (admin-only) renders an ESO PushSecret to an allow-listed ClusterSecretStore; the OpenBao path is fixed per client (<prefix><namespace>/<name>); the previous Entra secret is not revoked until the push after a rotation has synced; the OpenBao copy is deleted with the client |
apply_push_secret / delete_push_secret records, SecretPushed condition, OpenBao audit device |
Logical access | SC-28, IA-5(1) | Cyber security |
| Deprovisioning | deletionPolicy: Retain (default) revokes all secrets and keeps the app as evidence; Delete soft-deletes |
remove_password / delete_application records |
Logical access | AC-2(3) | Cyber security |
| Software supply chain integrity | cargo-deny (advisories, licences, sources), SBOM (CycloneDX + BuildKit), cosign keyless signature, SLSA provenance, digest-pinned image | CI run, Rekor entry, attestation | Change management (SDLC) | SR-4, SR-11, SI-7, SA-15 | Technology operations (SDLC) |
Open items before production¶
- Leader election and HA. Run one active replica with leader election so a failover never produces two writers. Required for a tier-0 dependency.
- OpenBao sink. Opt-in delivery to OpenBao through an ESO
PushSecretexists (spec.pushSecret), but the Kubernetes Secret is still always written because the PushSecret reads from it. Still open: making OpenBao the only copy, and splitting the Dex and Entra secrets. Until then, enable KMS encryption at rest and restrict Secret read RBAC. - Approval intake. Today an admin creates the ResourceSetInputProvider by hand. Connect it to the change system (e.g. an ExternalService input provider backed by the approval API) so approvals are not retyped.
- Admission policies on the target platform. Both policies are tested
against a Kubernetes 1.36 API server in kind on every PR. Still open:
confirming the target AKS version serves
MutatingAdmissionPolicyatv1(or replacing it with Kyverno there). - Flux field ownership. Confirm that the ResourceSet does not revert
owner-set
redirectURIs(it should not, since it never sets that field). - Entra log reconciliation. A scheduled job comparing Entra directory audit logs for the controller's SP against the controller's audit stream.
- Egress restriction. Allow only
login.microsoftonline.com,graph.microsoft.comand the API server (FQDN-aware egress or proxy). - Group assignment. Needs
AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, a privileged permission IAM should approve separately; not implemented. - Retention periods. Confirm audit log retention with Records Management.
- Threat model and penetration test before onboarding production teams.
- Automated integration tests. The end-to-end scenarios in the developer guide have been run by hand against a non-production tenant (create, drift, approval gate, rotation, OpenBao delivery, deletion). Still open: running them in CI, and rotation crash-recovery scenarios.