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Why Charter

The problem

Every application that signs users in with Entra ID needs an app registration. In most organisations these are created by hand in the portal, or by a ticket to a central identity team. Both routes have the same weaknesses:

  • Slow and manual. A team waits days for a registration and a secret, and again for every redirect URI change.
  • Weak evidence. The ticket says what was asked for; nothing proves the registration still looks like that six months later.
  • Secrets by email. Client secrets are copied out of the portal and passed around, and they expire on dates nobody tracks, which causes outages.
  • No owner. Registrations outlive the teams that asked for them.

What Charter does about it

Need How Charter meets it
Self-service without losing control Admins create a client once; the owning team then maintains its own redirect URIs through the Kubernetes API, within a domain policy.
Every change authorised Creation and admin-only changes need a requester, a different approver and a change reference. The controller re-checks this before touching Entra.
Every change evidenced Each Graph mutation is recorded as attempted before the call and succeeded or failed after it, as JSON and as a Kubernetes Event.
Configuration stays as approved Hand edits in the portal (name, redirect URIs, group claims, owners, extra secrets) are detected and reverted, with a drift_detected record.
No secrets passed by hand The client secret is delivered straight into a Kubernetes Secret, and optionally OpenBao. Nobody sees it.
No surprise expiry Secrets rotate automatically when a third of their lifetime is left; the old one stays valid for a grace window.
Least privilege The controller holds only Application.ReadWrite.OwnedBy, so it can only touch registrations it created.
No standing credential for the controller It authenticates with workload identity federation; there is no secret to leak.

Prior art

Checked 2026-11-12.

Option Manages Entra apps? Notes
Cluster API Azure (CAPZ) No Uses Entra and workload identity to provision clusters; no app-registration CRDs.
Azure Service Operator v2 Yes, recently entra.azure.com Application since v2.21.0, ServicePrincipal since v2.22.0, plus SecurityGroup. No federated credential or client secret resource.
Crossplane provider-azuread Yes, broadest Applications, service principals, federated identity credentials, passwords. Terraform-based (Upjet), so it carries a heavy runtime.
Charter Yes, narrow One opinionated resource that also does secret delivery, rotation, Dex config, approvals and auditing, which none of the above do.

Reuse. If Azure Service Operator or Crossplane is already in place, Charter's Graph module could be swapped for one that writes their Application and ServicePrincipal objects, keeping the parts they lack: approvals, auditing, rotation, secret delivery and Dex config. The reconcile shape stays the same.

Non-goals

  • Not a general Entra management tool. Charter manages web app registrations for sign-in, with single-tenant audience (AzureADMyOrg). It does not manage users, groups, conditional access or API permissions.
  • No group assignment yet. Assigning groups to the app needs AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, a privileged permission that should be approved separately.
  • Not an identity provider. Dex or Entra is the identity provider; Charter only wires them together.